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Abstract 
 
The current research aimed to identify whether a model of juror decision making (i.e. the 
threshold model) that encompasses both rational and intuitive decision making exists. Sixty 
participants were selected who would be eligible for jury duty in Scotland. These individuals 
read nine vignettes and rated the evidence of each vignette separately by placing the evidence 
in either a guilty, not guilty or not proven (a verdict type specific to Scotland) counter. 
Participants were asked after each piece of information to state how likely they thought the 
suspect was of being guilty on a scale from 1 to 100. The data were best described using a 
flexible model (i.e., a diffusion model) that allowed for information integration. Future 
research should examine whether or not the diffusion model can explain cognitive fallacies, 
such as confirmation bias, commonly studied in decision science.  
 
Keywords: Jurors, Decision Making, Stopping Rule, Information Integration, Heuristics, cue 
utilisation, Law, Psychology, Court Room, Not Proven Verdict.  
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Threshold Utilisation in Juror Decision Making 
 
Jurors make potentially life changing decisions, with relatively little training and 
potentially no previous experience. Jurors are given the responsibility of delivering justice to 
both the state and victim (Roberts & Murray, 2014; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 
2008). This raises the question: how do jurors make decisions despite their lack of legal 
experience? The current research aimed to identify the process through which legal 
laypersons reach decisions when they are presented with legal information. The present study 
specifically focusses on the Scottish legal system.  
Much of the legal and decision making research has focussed on the American legal 
system and American jurors (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). These American focussed research 
investigations cannot easily be generalised to Scottish jurors or the Scottish legal system. 
This is because the Scottish legal system has very unique aspects, such as the not proven 
verdict (Duff, 1999). The not proven verdict is an extra acquittal verdict, which is uniquely 
utilised in Scotland and has no legal definition (Duff, 1999). 
From the limited research on juror decision making emerging from Scotland, there are 
some notable examples. For instance, Smithson, Deady, and Gracik (2007) found that task 
difficulty was the only variable that consistently forecasted not proven verdicts. In addition, 
Hope, Greene, Memon, Gavisk, and Houston (2008) focussed on how a third verdict of not 
proven would affect conviction rates (i.e., outcome analysis) when the strength of evidence 
varied. It was found that in cases considered ‘moderate’, the availability of the not proven 
verdict reduced conviction rates, and that if a not proven verdict was available the number of 
not guilty verdicts was also reduced. The research by Smithson et al. (2007) and Hope et al. 
(2008) focussed on decision outcomes, however, and did not explore the cognitive processes 
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that allowed for certain decisions to be reached. To better understand these outcomes, more 
research is needed that investigates the processes behind them. 
One contemporary area of decision making research which puts the focus on the 
process rather than outcomes and that can apply to the court room is fast and frugal heuristics 
(or ‘cognitive rules of thumb’; Murray & Thomson, 2010). Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) 
found that one of their heuristics known, as the Take The Best heuristic, where an option is 
chosen based on the first cue that allows a binary set of responses to be discriminated, was as 
accurate as multiple regression analysis when making decisions in regards to city sizes.  
Lee and Cummins (2004) used the fast and frugal heuristic metaphor when 
investigating how individuals decide if a gas is poisonous or not, and adapted it into a more 
global theory that could explain decision making data more adequately. Their experiment 
compared a rational decision making strategy (called RAT) with the TTB (where information 
is searched in the memory of the decision maker from the most valid to the least valid cue; 
Gigernzer & Goldstein, 1996) model. Both strategies were found to have been used, but not 
exclusively, across 52.5% of participants in the sample, which means that some participants 
used strategies that resembled both RAT and the TTB model (i.e. intra-strategy differences) 
over the course of the five comparisons (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Lee & Cummins, 2004).  
Further, a unified threshold model (which combined RAT and TTB) accounted for more of 
the decision making behaviour than any single model could do alone (Lee & Cummins, 
2004). For instance, the unified threshold model accounted for 84.5% (Compared to RAT= 
64% and TTB = 36%) of the decision making strategies utilised by the participants (Lee & 
Cummins, 2004).  Therefore, a more suitable metaphor for decision making may be that the 
participants adapted their stopping rule (which can be referred to as a threshold) to the task, 
as this allowed both strategies (i.e. RAT and TTB) to be incorporated into a single model. For 
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instance, a small information search would mirror heuristic decision making, and a larger 
information search would mirror rational decision making (Newell & Lee, 2009).  
Several different threshold models could potentially explain juror decision making. 
Each of these threshold models fits into two broad categories involving absolute stopping 
rules (the counter model) and relative stopping rules (the diffusion model). Although there 
are a number of threshold models, the current study concentrates on only two broad 
categories of threshold decision making models, which are mentioned above.  
The models mentioned above are mathematical models, and Ratcliff and Smith (2004) 
should be consulted for a more mathematical description of the models. However, the current 
piece of research will be one of the first pieces of research that tries to map the models to 
juror decision making data and that tries to differentiate the models using inferential statistics 
and dependent measures: such as likelihood of guilt data, to assess if thresholds are reached 
through information integration; and, evidence rating data, which will investigate if 
thresholds are reached through the counting of different evidence ratings into specific 
counters.  
Absolute stopping rule models propose that when individuals, such as jurors, are 
making decisions they collect evidence on separate counters (alternatives) with separate 
thresholds (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Potter, 2011; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). For instance, for 
jurors, the two counters could relate to verdict decisions (Walters, 2007). One counter could 
be for a guilty verdict, and another counter could be for a not guilty verdict (Smith & Ratcliff, 
2004). In these counters, the same mechanism, as described by Lee and Cummins (2004), 
occurs. The threshold which is reached first leads to an absolute stopping rule, and causes a 
decision to be made (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Rouder, 2001). Consequently, if the threshold 
in the guilty counter is reached first, then the juror will give a guilty verdict, whereas if the 
counter in the not guilty verdict is reached first, then the legal layperson will give a not guilty 
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verdict. Further, in race models, where evidence races towards a threshold, there may be 
more than two counts, which suggests that Scottish jurors could count not proven evidence 
until a threshold is reached (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Similarly, some count models, like the 
linear ballistic model, have been shown to be an appropriate metaphor for choices that have 
more than two outcomes (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). 
 Furthermore, count data will measured in the current study, by asking participants to 
count information/evidence into one of three counters. Further, participants will be able to 
place information into either their guilty counter, their not guilty counter or their not proven 
counter. Previous research has provided support for the counter model in the court room 
(Thomas & Hogue, 1970). However, the current study will be the first investigation to 
establish if count information allows thresholds to be reached, thus allowing verdicts to be 
given, using inferential statistics. 
The second theoretical approach relates to relative stopping rules. Ratcliff & Smith 
(2004) outline that in relative stopping rules information integration occurs until one 
alternative is favoured over another, symbolised by a threshold. Then the appropriate decision 
is made. In other words, if the integration of evidence causes a certain amount of the 
information to favour a guilty verdict, by reaching the guilty boundary/threshold, then a 
guilty response will be given. Therefore, the thresholds in the proposed research should be 
distinct from one another. The diffusion model is a more dynamic approach than the absolute 
stopping rule approach (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This is because in the relative stopping rule 
approach, the two thresholds are on the same continuum and evidence is integrated together, 
which means that information that supports one outcome has a detrimental impact on the 
other outcome (Gold & Shadlen, 2007).  
The diffusion model fits previous decision making data better than count models 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Further, the starting points in the diffusion model can vary 
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depending on how early the decision making process has started, which may fit in well with 
biased jurors, and jurors who may be affected by pre-trial information (Laming, 1968; 
Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). This skewed starting (or prior) point may 
cause the prior point to be closer to one threshold over the other, which may explain 
commonly observed biases. Furthermore, prior information may skew the prior point to be 
closer to the threshold point that best matches or represents the prior information.  
Research on this approach has suggested that the further away the threshold is from the 
starting point, the slower and more accurate the response will be (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; 
Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). This suggests that jurors with higher thresholds (who use more 
information) are more accurate than jurors with lower thresholds (frugal legal laypersons; 
Sangero & Halpert, 2007). Diffusion models of decision making have been supported by 
neuroscience (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004), electroencephalograms (EEG) and psychophysics 
(Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). 
 The current study will investigate if information integration (using likelihood of guilt 
ratings) allows thresholds to be reached. Previous research has utilized similar methods when 
studying information integration (see Estrada-Reynolds et al., 2015). Further, the research 
will investigate if different likelihoods of guilt are associated with different thresholds, thus 
highlighting that once a decision maker’s drift reaches a particular threshold, does a specific 
verdict choice become more appropriate. That is, if a guilty (not guilty) threshold is reached 
through information integration a guilty (not guilty) verdict is given, unless said threshold is 
re-surpassed leading to a verdict reversal (Potter, 2011).  This has been confirmed in previous 
research through mathematical modelling (Ratcliff and Smith, 2004). The current research 
will be the first of its kind to establish if the diffusion model fits psychological data from 
mock jurors using inferential statistics. Traditionally in diffusion models there are two points, 
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the prior point and the threshold point. However, the current research will add an additional 
point, called the last point. The reasoning for this last likelihood point is to investigate if drift 
continues/changes in jurors once they have reached a threshold, as unlike previous 
investigations jurors have no control over information search.  
The literature has highlighted three main issues. First, that the threshold model may be 
a more suitable model for legal decisions in comparison to heuristics and more rational 
models. Second, that the Scottish legal system, with its three verdict options, is unique and 
needs proper scientific enquiry. And, finally, that threshold models of decision making may 
help to explain juror decision making in the unique three verdict system. Therefore, the 
current study will assess using likelihood data (to symbolise information integration) and 
evidence ratings, which highlight which verdict (guilty, not guilty and not proven) that 
particular piece of evidence favours (i.e., to represent count data), in an attempt to find out 
which model, either the count model or diffusion model, best describes the decision making 
processes of jurors.  
It is expected that in the current study that likelihood of guilt ratings will differ across 
verdict types. The reasoning for this is because likelihoods will symbolize information 
integration (or drift) in the current study, and previous research has showed that drift differs 
depending on the outcome that is reached (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Further, it is believed that 
the three likelihoods points (prior, threshold and last) will differ in the current study. This is 
because previous research has shown that drift allows decision makers to move from their 
prior point to a point where a decision can be made (i.e., their threshold point). Therefore, in 
the current study, it is expected that if the diffusion model is explaining the decision making 
data that the threshold point will differ from the prior point, thus allowing a decision to be 
made. Similarly, it is expected that the last point will also differ from the prior point, 
otherwise a verdict associated with their prior point should be given; that is, the not guilty 
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verdict, as such a verdict may be favored initially at the prior point because of the “innocent 
until proven guilty” belief.  
It is, also, believed that a significant interaction will exist between the verdict given and 
the likelihood points. This is because it is expected that both different drifts and thresholds 
(i.e., guilty and not guilty threshold) will lead to different legal decisions, which can be 
confirmed by previous research by Ratcliff and Smith (2004). Contrary, if the count model 
explains decision making data the best, it would be expected that the last piece of count data 
(evidence ratings) needed would have a strong and significant relationship with the verdict 
that is given. This is because the last piece of count information needed should push decision 
makers beyond their threshold, thus allowing a response to be made. Therefore, you would 
expect the response made to correspond to the counter that the piece of evidence was placed 
in. For example, it would be expected that when the last piece of evidence needed was rated 
as guilty (not guilty), then a guilty (not guilty) verdict should be given. This expectation can 
be justified by previous research by Thomas and Hogue (1970), which proposed that jurors 
could make decisions using independent counters and thresholds.  
In summary, drift, or information integration, will be measured by asking participants 
to state the likelihood of guilt associated with the suspect after each piece of evidence (in a 
similar manner to Estrada-Reynolds et al., 20015). In addition, count evidence will be 
measured by asking individuals to supply individual evidence ratings (guilty, not guilty and 
not proven) after each piece of evidence, thus symbolizing the counter in which specific 
pieces of evidence have been placed. Further, the last piece of evidence needed to make a 
decision will symbolize the threshold being reached and will have a corresponding evidence 
rating (count data) and likelihood (drift), which will allow the researchers to assess if a 
threshold was reached through information integration or through using a collection of 
individual pieces of evidence placed in a specific counters.  The current research 
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consequently aims to investigate which threshold model of decision making best applies to 
the Scottish juror system, where three verdicts are available. It is hypothesised that: 
H1. There will be significant differences between each of the three (diffusion) points 
studied (prior, threshold and last) in relation to likelihoods. 
H2. There will be significant differences between each of the three verdicts types (guilty, 
not guilty and not proven) in terms of likelihoods. 
H3. There will be a significant interaction between verdict type and diffusion points in 
relation to likelihood of guilt.  
H4. There will be a significant association between the ratings (count given) of the last cue 
needed and the verdict given (for each of the different verdict types).  
 
Method 
Design 
A mixed factorial quasi-experimental design was used, in which verdict (guilty, not 
guilty, not proven) was the between-subjects factor, and likelihood point (prior, threshold, 
last) was the within-subjects factor. These three likelihood levels were applied because it was 
important to see if they differed across and between the different verdict types that were 
given. Furthermore, the prior point was the likelihood point given after the context had been 
provided on a case, but before evidence had been shown. The prior point was situated at this 
point, so that it would show if participants had pre-trial verdict preferences before they had 
seen any relevant information. The threshold point was the likelihood point which was 
associated with the stopping rule. The last point was the likelihood point which was related to 
the likelihood of a guilt rating given to the last piece of evidence shown in a case.  
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The first dependent variable utilised in the current research was the likelihood of guilty 
rating, which ranged from 1 to 100: 1 symbolised definitely not guilty, 50 represented not 
proven, and 100 represented that the suspect was guilty (Price & Dahl, 2014; Thomas & 
Hogue, 1976; Windschitl, Scherer, Smith, Rose, 2013). This dependent variable highlighted 
whether or not information integration was occurring and allowed small changes to be 
tracked, similar to traditional drift models that have used logarithmic odds (Bitzer, Park, 
Blankenburg, & Kiebel, 2014; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Vandekerckhove, & Tuerlinckx, 
2008). 
Participants were also asked to rate each of the pieces of evidence as either guilty, not 
guilty, or not proven. This was to mirror the count model where evidence is counted 
separately. Participants were also asked to state the last piece of evidence they needed to 
make a decision at the end of each vignette. This symbolised when a threshold was reached. 
This information was also used to measure the dependent measure of cue utilisation (how 
much evidence was used by the mock jurors). Participants also stated, after each vignette, 
which verdict they thought was the most appropriate.  
 
Participants 
Sixty participants (31 females; 21 students; 39 non-students with a range of 
professional and manual employment) were recruited via opportunity sampling. Post-hoc 
power analysis was ran using the software G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). The sample size mentioned above was used, the alpha level utilized was p < .05, and a 
large effect size of F = 0.59 was chosen because of the uniqueness of the research. The 
analysis highlighted that the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the diffusion analysis was 
adequately powered, with an actual power of .98.  
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Recruitment posters were placed within university campuses and on social media sites 
(such as Facebook) and a snowballing technique was also employed by asking participants to 
pass on the study contact information to other eligible individuals. Participants were only 
eligible to take part in the current study if they were juror eligible (Scottish Court Service, 
2015). The mean age of participants was 26.8 years (SD = 9.6 years).  
 
Materials 
Standardised information sheets, consent forms and debriefing sheets were employed 
with all participants. 
 
Legal inventory/demographics questionnaire 
This inventory identified prospective participants who could not take part in a real life 
jury. The demographics questionnaire collected details such as age and gender.  
 
Vignettes 
Nine vignettes were shown using the experiment-software package Superlab (Cedrus 
Corporation, 2014). The presentation order of the vignettes was changed after every 20 
participants to reduce order effects. The vignettes were drawn from real cases collected from 
media articles. All vignettes were based on murder trials. Three of the real trials resulted in 
guilty verdicts, three not proven verdicts, and three not guilty verdicts.  
Literature on vignette development (i.e. Ashill & Yavas, 2006; Heverly, Fitt, & 
Newman, 1984) was consulted when designing the vignettes. The vignettes were designed to 
be of similar length to reduce attentional biases. The information in each of the cases fell 
within a similar theme with the consistency of the information across vignettes assessed by 
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two of the authors (LC and JM), who evaluated and compared the evidence between the 
vignettes. The evidence from the prosecution was presented prior to the defence evidence in 
every trial. This was done so that consistent evidence was presented in comparable rankings, 
thus decreasing primacy/recency effects. The vignettes/cases in the current investigation were 
modest in length to prevent length acting as a confounding variable. On average the vignettes 
were 484 words long. The gender and ages of the victims and suspects across the vignettes 
were comparable. Piloting was conducted to guarantee that the familiarity, realism and 
severity of the trials were alike throughout the nine vignettes. 
Each stance (prosecution vs defence) presented between 5-9 pieces of evidence; see 
counterbalancing in Appendix 1 for more details. This varying number was chosen for two 
reasons: 1) so that memory constraints did not affect which cues were remembered within 
each of the stances when making a final verdict, which links with the Miller (1956) 7+-2 rule; 
2) the number varied for generalisability purposes, since, some cases in real life trials last 
longer and present more information than other trials.  
 
 
Procedure 
Participants read an information sheet and completed a consent form. They were told 
that their data would be used for court appeals (a mild deception); so that participants would 
think that, their responses had real world consequences.  They then completed the legal 
inventory and if eligible to take part, were given standardised instructions for the study on-
screen from within the experiment-software package being used. The procedure for each 
vignette was identical and was as follows. Participants were provided with an opening 
statement to provide context to the case. Participants were then asked to give a prior 
likelihood of guilt, ranging from 1-100. Participants were reminded how to rate the evidence 
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(either guilty, not guilty or not proven) and which buttons to press (G, N or P, respectively) to 
do this prior to evidence being presented. Next, participants were shown the pieces of 
evidence, with the prosecution evidence presented first, followed by defence evidence 
(Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005; Justice Education Society of BC, 2016). Cross-
examinations were not included to avoid problems that could arise by the materials becoming 
too complex. Participants rated each piece of evidence as either guilty, not guilty or not 
proven. They were also asked to give a likelihood of guilt rating after each piece of evidence, 
again ranging from 1-100; which symbolised information integration. Once each piece of 
evidence had been read and evaluated, participants were asked to give a final verdict: guilty, 
a not guilty or a not proven verdict. Then participants were asked to identify the last piece of 
evidence that they needed to make their decision. This response symbolised their threshold 
being reached, and allowed cue utilisation to be quantified. This process was repeated for 
each of the nine vignettes. Once all nine vignettes had been completed, participants read 
through the debrief sheet. 
 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for Verdict Types 
Fifty-nine participants gave a guilty verdict at least once, 58 gave a not proven verdict 
at least once and 39 gave a not guilty verdict at least once. The verdict groupings were 
therefore, relatively, similar. Data for each of the points (prior, threshold and last) was 
averaged within the verdict types given by the participants. For example, if an individual 
gave four not proven verdicts, the data (prior, threshold and last likelihood points) that were 
analysed was an average gathered from the four not proven verdict given. Likewise, if the 
same participant gave two guilty verdicts and three not guilty verdicts, each of the likelihood 
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points would be averaged within their verdict type, and this average was used for the 
analysis. Table 1 sets out the descriptive statistics for the data points that were averaged 
across verdict types.   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
As shown in Table 1, the mean increases from the prior point to the threshold point for 
guilty verdicts, and then minimally decreases from the threshold point to the last point. The 
median shows a similar pattern. The standard deviation seems to decrease from the prior 
point to the threshold point, which may highlight greater variation in the guilty prior point in 
comparison to the guilty threshold point. Similarly, for not guilty verdicts there is an increase 
in the mean between the prior and threshold point, and a decrease between the threshold point 
and the last point. The median remains relatively stable throughout the decision making 
process, with a dip between the threshold point and last point.  The standard deviation shows 
a similar pattern. The standard deviation is higher in not guilty verdicts at all the stages of the 
decision making process, thus highlighting a higher variation in drift within not guilty 
verdicts. The mean and the median for not proven verdicts changes throughout the three 
points, increasing between the prior and threshold point and then decreasing between the last 
point and threshold point. The standard deviation decreases through each of the three points.  
 
Investigating Verdict Choices across Likelihood Points  
A two-way mixed-groups Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with verdict given (guilty, 
not guilty, not proven) as the between-subjects factor and likelihood point (prior, threshold, 
last) as the within-subjects factor was carried out. There was a significant main effect of 
verdict given: F(2, 153)=110.5,  p<.001, ηp²=.59, large effect size. Tukey’s post hoc tests 
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highlighted that guilty verdicts had significantly higher likelihood ratings (M=71) than not 
guilty verdicts (M=43.4) and not proven verdicts (M=55.2; p=.001, p<.001, respectively). Not 
proven verdicts had likelihood ratings that were significantly (p<.001) higher than the 
likelihood ratings in not guilty verdicts.  
For the variable of likelihood points, the Greenhouse-Geisser row was conulsted as 
Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant: p<.001. There was a significant main effect of 
likelihood point: F(1.6, 243.5)=122.4; p<.001, ηp²=.44, large effect size.  Bonferroni post hoc 
tests revealed that the prior likelihood point (M=44.5) was significantly lower than both the 
threshold likelihood point (M=65.4) and the last likelihood (M=59.7) point (p<.001, p<.001, 
respectively). The threshold likelihood point was significantly (p<.001) higher than the last 
likelihood point.  
There was a significant interaction between the likelihood points and the verdicts given: 
F(4,306)=33; p<.001, ηp²=.30, which is a large effect size. See Figure 1 for visual 
representation of interaction. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Simple main effects showed that for guilty verdicts the prior point (M=47.2) was 
significantly lower than the threshold point (M=83.9) and last point (M=81.8; p<.001, p<.001, 
respectively). The threshold point and last point were not significantly different from one 
another (p=.17).  When investigating not proven verdicts, it was evident that the prior point 
(M=44.9) was significantly lower than the threshold point (M=62.6) and the last point (M=58; 
p<.001, p<.001, respectively). The threshold point was also significantly higher than the last 
point (P<.01).  For not guilty verdicts, the prior point (M=41.5) was significantly (p<.01) 
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lower than the threshold point (M=49.7). The prior point did not significantly (p=.45) differ 
from the last point (M=39.2). However, the last point was significantly (p<.001) lower than 
the threshold point.  
When investigating the prior point, guilty verdicts (M=47.2) did not differ significantly 
from not proven (M=44.9) or not guilty (M=41.5) verdicts (p=.41, p=.07, respectively) in 
relation to likelihood of guilt. Likewise, not proven and not guilty verdicts did not 
significantly (p=.27) differ from one another in relation to the likelihood of guilt at the prior 
point.  For the threshold point, guilty verdicts (M=83.9) had a significantly higher likelihood 
of guilt than not proven (M=62.6) and not guilty (M=49.7) verdicts (p<.001, p<.001, 
respectively). Not proven and not guilty verdicts significantly differed from one another in 
relation to the likelihood of guilt measured at the threshold point (p<.001), with not proven 
verdicts having a higher likelihood of guilt. In relation to the last point, guilty verdicts 
(M=81.8) had a significantly (p<.001) higher likelihood of guilt in comparison to both not 
proven (M=58) and not guilty (M=39.2) verdicts. Finally, the last point was significantly 
higher in not proven verdicts in comparison to not guilty verdicts (p<.001).  
 
Cue Utilisation 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for Cue utilisation.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was carried out to compare cue utilisation across 
the different verdict options. There was a significant difference in the cue utilisation between 
the three verdicts: F(2, 537)=173.7; p<.001. Post hoc Tukey’s tests highlighted that 
significantly fewer cues were utilised when a guilty decision was given (M=6.2) in 
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comparison to when a not proven (M=11.4) and not guilty verdict (M=11.7) was given 
(p<.001, p<.001, respectively). There were no significant differences (p = .66) in cue 
utilisation between not guilty and not proven verdicts.  
 
Count Analysis  
Descriptive Statistics for Last Count Rating needed and Verdict Given 
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 3 relate to the last cue/count ratings needed 
(which allowed a threshold to be reached), and the verdict given by the participants.    
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The data was collected using categorical data (i.e. guilty, not guilty and not proven). 
For the current analysis, the frequency of each verdict type was counted for each of the 
participants. Likewise, the frequency for each of the different count types (guilty, not guilty 
and not proven) needed for a threshold to be reached was counted for every participant.  For 
example, if a participant gave five guilty verdicts over the nine trials, their cumulative score 
for the number of guilty verdicts given would be five, and if they rated the last cue/count they 
needed as not guilty four times, their cumulative score for the last cue/count they needed for 
not guilty verdicts would be four.  
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to identify if the last piece of evidence needed 
allowed a decision to be reached. The correlations highlighted that significant relationships 
existed between the last count rating and the verdict which was given. A significant 
relationship existed between the last piece of count evidence needed (when rated as guilty) 
and the number of guilty verdicts given: r=.82, p<.001, r2=.67. There was a significant 
relationship between the last piece of evidence needed (when rated as not guilty) and the 
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corresponding verdict when not guilty verdicts were given: r=.35, p=.007, r2=.12. Finally, the 
number of not proven verdicts given had a significant relationship with the last cue/count 
needed when rated as not proven: r=.51, p<.001, r2=.26.  
 
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to identify which threshold model of decision making 
best describes juror decision making within the Scottish criminal justice system, where three 
verdict options are available. This was the first study of its kind that investigated the decision 
making processes behind legal verdicts. Additionally, this was the first study that has 
differentiated the not proven verdict from the not guilty verdict in regards to a stopping rule, 
thus highlighting that Scottish jurors reach not proven verdicts for different reasons to why 
they reach not guilty verdicts.  
Diffusion and count models of decision making were explicitly investigated, by looking 
at final verdict ratings, decision thresholds, and both evidence ratings and likelihood of guilt 
ratings. This investigation has provided greater insight into the cognitive processes of juror 
decision making, rather than a sole focus on outcomes, as has been much of the focus in the 
existing literature. It is the first piece of research to empirically compare these models to juror 
decision making. It also investigated the ‘unique’ Not Proven verdict option, currently used 
within the Scottish legal system. Again, this is a novel exploration, as threshold models are 
normally investigated using binary outcome options rather than tertiary. 
The first hypothesis posited that the three likelihood points (i.e. prior, threshold and 
last) would be significantly different from one another; this was supported.  The general trend 
over the three verdicts was to start off at a prior point (i.e. without any evidence) move 
significantly higher to a threshold likelihood (i.e. a relative stopping rule), and then move 
significantly lower to a final point. The fact that the three points are distinct supports the 
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notion that individuals start at a prior point, then information accrual causes the them to reach 
a threshold point (allowing a response to be given) and that information integration (or 
distortion) continues once a decision has/can be made. This may allow for the possibility of 
verdict reversals. The fact that the threshold and last point differ also highlighted that the 
threshold point may be a pivotal and independent point in the decision making process, which 
allows verdicts to be reached. In other words, the confirmation of the hypothesis supports the 
idea of a diffusion model being applied to legal decision making.  
The second hypothesis was also confirmed: there was a significant difference in 
likelihood ratings across verdicts, with guilty verdicts having significantly higher mean 
ratings than not proven verdicts, and not guilty verdicts. This highlighted that the way that the 
information was integrated was significantly different across the verdicts. This idea of 
information integration (represented by the likelihood of guilty values) in mock juror decision 
making is supported by previous research. Ostrom, Werner and Saks (1978) found that jurors 
initially thought that the suspect was innocent and that this belief was averaged, with the 
evidence in a trial, to give the final verdict. Estrada-Reynolds, Gray and Nunez (2015) found 
similar results. The likelihood rating analysis, therefore, highlighted that the evidence from 
the cases was integrated differently between the verdict types. This evidence of information 
integration supports a diffusion (i.e. drift) model of decision making (Ratcliff & Smith, 
2004). The confirmation of this hypothesis also shows that the process behind the not proven 
verdict is distinct from the process that allows a not guilty verdict to be reached. Therefore, 
showing that jurors understand the differences between the verdicts, and use them differently 
depending on how they integrate information and which threshold has been reached.  
The third hypothesis was also accepted: there was a significant interaction between the 
two independent variables (i.e. verdict and likelihood points). Because the results showed that 
the likelihood thresholds (i.e. relative stopping rule) were different across the verdicts, this 
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proposes that the reaching of a likelihood boundary informed the responses given (Wells, 
1992). Additionally, because the last points were significantly different across the verdicts, 
thresholds were not re-surpassed, implying that appropriate responses were made. For 
example, drift caused the guilty (not guilty) threshold to be reached, and because the 
threshold was not re-surpassed a guilty (not guilty) was then given. Not proven verdicts can 
be said to be verdicts that fall in-between guilty and not guilty thresholds, and are 
consequently in the limbo boundary of not proven. Therefore, it can be said that the not 
proven verdict is a verdict where innocence is doubted but guilt cannot be confirmed. The 
acceptance of the third hypothesis further suggests that in each of the verdicts, evidence 
accumulated until a threshold was reached, and that evidence acquired after this point did not 
affect the response that was given (or cause a verdict reversal). Although, it must be 
mentioned that by asking participants to state the last piece of evidence, the researchers were 
only looking at the last threshold reached. Furthermore, participants could have crossed 
several thresholds throughout a trial, but it is the last threshold crossed that determines the 
verdict that is given.  
The starting points for each of the verdicts were similar, suggesting that jurors in a 
three verdict system are not affected by pre-trial biases, and that the jurors believed initially 
that neither of the Anglo-American verdicts had been proven yet. An alternative explanation 
is that all of the participants are biased towards the defence. This is because all of the 
participants start with similar likelihoods of guilt and because the not guilty threshold point is 
above all of the different verdicts prior points. Furthermore, it is more likely that all of the 
jurors had a similar initial belief in “innocence until proven guilty”, as the point at which a 
not guilty verdict could be given was above all of the prior points, regardless of verdict type. 
The threshold points were significantly different from each other, suggesting that 
information is integrated together, causing likelihood ratings to drift to a boundary, which 
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then allowed a response to be made (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).  The results, therefore, suggest 
that a third verdict can be incorporated into a relative stopping rule model by allowing 
thresholds/boundaries to be re-surpassed. In addition, the last points all varied from each 
another across the verdicts. This further supported the idea of distinct decision making 
processes across the three verdict types. Furthermore, the interaction analysis highlighted that 
the decision making processes were distinct across the three verdict types, and that 
information integration and thresholds allowed verdicts to be reached.  
The interaction also highlighted that the decision making process for each of the 
verdicts varied. For example, with guilty verdicts, the decision making process drifted from 
the prior point to the threshold point, thus allowing a guilty verdict to be given. There was no 
difference between the threshold point and last point is guilty verdicts. Furthermore, the 
decision making process of guilty verdicts was found to be non-compensatory (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996): the combination of available cues could not over-ride the guilty verdict 
made using, on average, 6.2 pieces of information.  
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that in the theorised diffusion model that drift 
can continue post-threshold and the drift can either confirm the leading verdict (that is the 
threshold that was last passed) or disconfirm the current threshold. The current research has 
shown that the information presented post-threshold in guilty verdicts seemed not to have a 
significant effect on drift. However, it is likely that if strong defence evidence was placed 
near the end of a trial, that the drift would be negative, thus causing the threshold to be re-
surpassed and allowing a verdict reversal. Future research will investigate this by 
manipulating the order of evidence using strength ratings.   
The decision making process of not proven verdicts was unique in relation to the other 
three verdicts. For instance, not proven verdicts started off with their prior likelihood near the 
middle of the scoring system, then significantly rose to the threshold point.  The likelihood 
Juror Decision Making 23 
 
score at the last point was significantly lower than that at the threshold point. This highlighted 
that the drift of not proven verdicts initially rose in a similar fashion to guilty verdicts. 
However, through a collection of cues the drift reaches a decision making zone of not proven, 
which is in-between the guilty and not guilty thresholds. Further, for not proven verdicts, the 
rise may be enough to escape the not guilty boundary, but may not be sufficient enough to 
cross the guilty threshold, leaving the juror’s verdict in a not proven limbo. 
Nevertheless, if more information had been provided, the drift could have went in one 
of three ways:  
1) The drift may not have changed much, and a not proven verdict would still have 
been given;  
2) The drift may have increased until a guilty threshold was reached, thus allowing a 
guilty verdict to be given,  
3)  A decrease in drift may have occurred until the not guilty threshold was surpassed, 
allowing a not guilty verdict to be given.  
In summary, drift is constant, but the last thresholds crossed determines the verdict that is 
given. For example, one juror could cross the guilty thresholds using one piece of information 
and then give a guilty verdict because the rest of the information does not cause the guilty 
threshold to be re-surpassed. However, another juror could start of in the not guilty boundary, 
and then their drift could increase after five pieces of information until they reach the guilty 
boundary. Then, once piece of information could cause them to drop below the guilty 
boundary, and if the rest of the information did not cause a change in the decision making 
drift, the juror would then give a not proven verdict.  
The decision making process of not guilty verdicts was distinct from the other two 
verdicts. The analysis highlighted that not guilty verdicts started with a middling prior 
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likelihood, and then increased, significantly, to the threshold point. Then the likelihood value 
significantly dropped to the last point. This, alongside the fact that, on average, not guilty 
verdicts used 11.7 pieces of information, indicates that initially the decision maker may have 
started off at a point of innocence, and then increased their likelihood ratings. Moreover, the 
threshold point would then symbolise when the jurors drift re-surpassed the not guilty 
threshold, after an initial rise, from the not proven area into the not guilty zone. Jurors who 
gave not guilty verdicts continued to decrease their likelihood ratings after crossing the not 
guilty threshold, showing that they became more convinced in the innocence of the suspect 
post-threshold.  
In addition, the fact that cue utilisation differed between the verdict types supports the 
notion of threshold decision making and information integration. This is because some 
verdicts (guilty) were reached using fewer cues in comparison to other verdict types (not 
guilty and not proven), which suggests that the weight of the information that is integrated 
and the frugalness of a threshold may determine the verdict that is reached. The results also 
show that the more compensatory the process is, the more likely the decision drift will favour 
acquittal verdicts in comparison to conviction verdicts. Interestingly, guilty verdicts were 
reached after 6.2 pieces of information, even though the smallest number of pieces of 
information shown in a case was 10 pieces of evidence. This, therefore, highlighted that 
individuals were making decisions before all the evidence was shown, which supports the 
view that once a threshold was reached a decision could be made. Furthermore, the current 
research has shown that through allowing both thresholds and information integration to vary 
both rational and heuristic processing can be mirrored.  
Significant associations were found, which supported the fourth hypothesis. This 
hypothesis related to investigating if individual counters, or evidence types, could allow 
decision makers to reach a threshold and thus give an associating verdict. The association 
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between guilty verdicts and the last guilty cue/counter needed was significant. The direction 
was positive and the correlation coefficient was strong. Likewise, the association between the 
last not guilty cue/count needed and not guilty verdicts was significant, positive and the 
coefficient was modest. Further, the relationship between the last not proven cue/count 
needed and not proven verdicts was significant, positive and the correlation coefficient was 
moderate. Thus providing some support that information was placed in one of three counters; 
guilty, not guilty and not proven; and that the thresholds that was reached first in each of the 
counters then informed the decision made.  
Despite the significant associations, the results indicated that count information might 
not be enough to allow thresholds to be reached. For instance, although the significance 
levels suggest that these results are below a 1% likelihood of occurring by chance, the 
correlation coefficients propose that the last cue/count ratings needed do not always allow a 
threshold to be reached. Further, because the correlation coefficients are not one, it proposes 
that more than just count information is needed to reach thresholds. Consequently, this 
implies that simply counting information does not allow a threshold to be reached; and, 
therefore that the decision making process is more integrative. In other words, count data 
does not always allow thresholds to be reached on their own, and information integration may 
explain why a boundary was reached more adequately. For example, evidence counted as 
guilty may be weak and may actually drift a juror away from a guilty threshold response (or 
keep the decision making process constant). In summary, the correlations do hold some 
support for the count model, but also cast doubt on how realistic the model may be in a juror 
setting.  
One potential limitation of this study is that there could be a lack of ecological validity, 
as the study was quasi-experimental. This artificial setting, with the lack of real life cues, may 
have affected the decision making process, and made what was observed in the current 
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experiment different from what may have occurred in a real life trial (Simon, 1956; Wiener et 
al., 2011). However, previous research comparing culpability ratings from participants who 
used transcripts versus participants who viewed eyewitnesses on a video camera found that it 
was the information, not the meduim, that was important in regards to the jurors beliefs of the 
culpabability of the suspects (Pezdek, Avila‐Mora, & Sperry, 2010). In addition, cognitive 
processes, such as decision making, happen in a similar manner irrespective of whether or not 
the cognitve processes are produced naturally or artifically (Watt & Quinn, 2008). 
Nevertheless, future research may want to try and increase the ecological validity of mock 
juror experiments through audio/visual stimuli, to more closely align to processes that would 
occur in a real life trial. 
A confounding effect  may have been introduced by asking participants to rate the 
evidence as guilty, not guilty, or not proven. and then rate the liklihood of guilt of the suspect 
from 1-100. The initial evidence rating may have anchored the liklihood of guilt ratings. 
There was no other way to collect both independent evidence ratings and liklihood of guilt 
data, however. Even if the liklihood of guilt evidence was anchored by the evidence ratings 
(i.e. count data), it does not take away from the fact that the diffusion model could explain the 
juror decision making data more sufficently than the count model could. Future research may 
want to repeat the current experimnet in a betweeen subjects method, where one group gives 
liklihood of guilt ratings and one group gives evidence ratings (count data), and then compare 
which model explains their own groups decision amking data in the most satisfactory manner.  
This study is the first to demonstrate that the diffusion model is a good metaphor for the 
decision making processes that occur within jurors, and that the decision making process of 
jurors may involve integrating information in a way that allows a threshold to be reached, 
which then allows a verdict response to be given if the threhsold is not re-surpassed. Further, 
the current piece of research has highlighted that all three verdict options in use within the 
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Scottish criminal justice systems have distinct threshold points, thus demonstrating that jurors 
have a different interpretation of  not proven and not guilty verdicts, contratsing with older 
research on the topic. The overarching findings of the study supports the fit of the diffusion 
model to the Scottish criminal justice system. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Verdict Type 
 
 Likelihood of Guilt Rating 
 Prior Threshold Last 
Guilty    
Mean 47.2 83.9 81.8 
Median 50.0 85.0 82.5 
Standard Deviation 14.1 9.6 11.5 
Not Guilty    
Mean 41.5 49.7 39.2 
Median 50.0 50.0 40.0 
Standard Deviation 20.2 18.2 15.1 
Not Proven    
Mean 44.9 62.6 58.0 
Median 50.0 63.5 59.0 
Standard Deviation 12.1 11.2 9.9 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of cue utilisation between verdicts 
 
Verdict Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Guilty 6.2 5 3.4 
Not Proven 11.4 11 3.3 
Not Guilty 11.7 11 3.0 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the absolute stopping rule 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 
Last Count Rated as 
Guilty 
4.0 4 1.9 
Last Count Rated as Not 
Guilty 
1.8 1 1.7 
Last Count Rated as 
Proven 
3.2 3 2.1 
Guilty Verdict 4.0 4 1.7 
Not Guilty Verdict 1.3 1 1.3 
Not Proven Verdict 3.6 4 2 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Details included in the nine vignettes, across the three verdict types handed 
down in the real-case trials. 
 
 Guilty Not Guilty Not proven 
Familiar 
victim 
2 familiar 
1 not 
1 familiar 
2 not 
2 familiar 
1 not 
Vulnerable 
victim 
2 vulnerable 
1 not 
1 vulnerable 
2 not 
2 vulnerable 
1 not 
Crime details 1.Housebreak/ 
stabbing 
2.Argument/multiple 
injuries 
3. Body not found. 
1.Head 
injury/strangled 
2.Neck 
injury/affixation 
3.self-
defence/stabbing 
1.Cut throat 
2.Body not found 
3. Multiple 
injuries/blow to 
head. 
Victim age 
(years) 
51, 16, 33 19, 44, 26 18, 43, 26 
Victim gender 2 female 
1 male 
1 female 
2 males 
3 female 
 
Accused age 20, 22, 39. 33, 49, 23. 33, 21, 33. 
Accused 
gender 
3 males 3 males 3 males 
 
Weapon used 2 yes, 1 unknown. 2 yes, 1 no. 2 yes, 1 unknown. 
N words in 
opening 
statement 
123, 110, 112. 
Mean =115 
129,104, 114. 
Mean=115.7 
125, 105, 122 
Mean= 117.3 
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Appendix 2. Cue types and number per vignette (case), across the three verdict types handed 
down in the real-case trials. 
 
 Guilty Not Guilty Not Proven 
Number of 
cues 
Case 1: prosecution 7. 
Defence 5. 
 
Case 3: prosecution 9. 
Defence 9. 
 
Case 6: prosecution 9 
Defence 6 
Case 2: prosecution 7. 
Defence =7. 
 
Case 4: prosecution 5. 
Defence 6. 
 
Case 5: prosecution 5. 
Defence 5. 
Case7: prosecution 6. 
Defence 5. 
 
Case 8: prosecution 9. 
Defence 7. 
 
Case 9: prosecution 7. 
Defence 6. 
Severity 
rating of 
case 
(mean) 
Case 1=4.69 
 
Case 3=4.13 
 
Case 6=3.56 
Case 2=4.25 
 
Case 4=3.88 
 
Case 5=3.94 
Case 7=4.13 
 
Case 8=3.38 
 
Case 9=1.94 
Familiarity 
rating of 
case 
(mean) 
Case 1=2.06 
 
Case 3=2.00 
 
Case 6=1.94 
Case 2=2.56 
 
Case 4=1.69 
 
Case 5=1.94 
Case 7=1.69 
 
Case 8=1.50 
 
Case 9=1.94 
Realism 
rating 
(mean) 
Case 1=3.81 
 
Case 3=3.50 
 
Case 6=3.44 
Case 2=4.00 
 
Case 4=3.50 
 
Case 5=4.19 
Case 7=3.56 
 
Case 8=3.75 
 
Case 9=4.19 
 
 
The severity, familiarity and realism scores were gathered from the pilot. Each of the scores 
mentioned could be ranked from one to five; one indicating a low score and five symbolising 
a high score.  
